Belief Elicitation: A Horse Race among Truth Serums

In survey studies, probabilistic expectations about uncertain events are typically elicited by asking respondents for their introspective beliefs. If more complex procedures are feasible, beliefs can be elicited by incentive compatible revealed preference mechanisms (“truth serums”). Various mechanisms have been proposed in the literature, which differ in the degree to which they account for respondents’ deviations from expected value maximization. In this paper, we pit non-incentivized introspection against five truth serums, to elicit beliefs in a simple two-player game. We test the internal validity (additivity and predictive power for own behavior), and the external validity (predictive power for other players’ behavior, or accuracy) of each method. We find no differences among the truth serums. Beliefs from incentivized methods are better predictors of subjects’ own behavior compared to introspection. However, introspection performs equally well as the truth serums in terms of accuracy and additivity.belief measurement;subjective probability;scoring rules;outcome matching;probability matching;internal validity;external validity

Higher Order Risk Attitudes, Demographics, and Financial Decisions

We conduct an experiment to study the prevalence of the higher order risk attitudes of prudence and temperance, in a large demographically representative sample, as well as in a sample of undergraduate students. Participants make pairwise choices between lotteries of the form proposed by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). The choices in these lotteries isolate prudent from imprudent, and temperate from intemperate, behavior. We relate individuals’ risk aversion, prudence, and temperance levels to demographics and financial decisions. We observe that the majority of individuals’ decisions are consistent with risk aversion, prudence, and temperance, in both the student and the demographically representative sample. An individual’s level of prudence is predictive of his wealth, saving, and borrowing behavior outside of the experiment, while temperance predicts the riskiness of portfolio choices. Our findings suggest that the coefficient of relative prudence for a representative individual is approximately equal to two.prudence;temperance;saving;portfolio choice;experiment

Process Fairness and Dynamic Consistency

Abstract: When process fairness deviates from outcome fairness, dynamic inconsistencies can arise as in nonexpected utility. Resolute choice (Machina) can restore dynamic consistency under nonexpected utility without using Strotz's precommitment. It can similarly justify dynamically consistent process fairness

Making the Anscombe-Aumann approach to ambiguity suitable for descriptive applications

The Anscombe-Aumann (AA) model, originally introduced to give a normative basis to expected utility, is nowadays mostly used for another purpose: to analyze deviations from expected utility due to ambiguity (unknown probabilities). The AA model makes two ancillary assumptions that do not refer to ambiguity: expected utility for risk and backward induction. These assumptions, even if normatively appropriate, fail descriptively. This paper relaxes these ancillary assumptions to avoid the descriptive violations, while maintaining AA’s convenient mixture operation. Thus, it becomes possible to test and apply all AA-based ambiguity theories descriptively while avoiding confounds due to violated ancillary assumptions. The resulting tests use only simple stimuli, avoiding noise due to complexity. We demonstrate the latter in a simple experiment where we find that three assumptions about ambiguity, commonly made in AA theories, are violated: reference independence, universal ambiguity aversion, and weak certainty independence. The second, theoretical, part of the paper accommodates the violations found for the first ambiguity theory in the AA model—Schmeidler’s CEU theory—by introducing and axiomatizing a reference dependent generalization. That is, we extend the AA ambiguity model to prospect theory

Belief Elicitation:A Horse Race among Truth Serums

In survey studies, probabilistic expectations about uncertain events are typically elicited by asking respondents for their introspective beliefs. If more complex procedures are feasible, beliefs can be elicited by incentive compatible revealed preference mechanisms (“truth serums”). Various mechanisms have been proposed in the literature, which differ in the degree to which they account for respondents’ deviations from expected value maximization. In this paper, we pit non-incentivized introspection against five truth serums, to elicit beliefs in a simple two-player game. We test the internal validity (additivity and predictive power for own behavior), and the external validity (predictive power for other players’ behavior, or accuracy) of each method. We find no differences among the truth serums. Beliefs from incentivized methods are better predictors of subjects’ own behavior compared to introspection. However, introspection performs equally well as the truth serums in terms of accuracy and additivity

Uncertainty in Individual and Social Decisions: theory and experiments

In most decisions we have to choose between options that involve some uncertainty about their outcomes and their effect on our well-being. Casual observation and carefully controlled studies suggest that, in making these decisions, we often deviate from the benchmark of expected income maximization. This should not come as a surprise. Our well-being is affected by many factors, and the outside observer does not know the importance of various dimensions of the outcome to the decision maker. Even if goals are well defined, it is far from obvious that we succeed in choosing what is best for us. The psychological literature has shown deviations from optimal behavior in simple decision tasks, and we may expect similar deviations to occur in more complex real life problems. In real life situations, however, experience and market interaction will help to restrain suboptimal behavior. This thesis examines deviations from expected income maximization in situations involving uncertainty. We focus on deviations generated by social factors

Empirical knowledge in legislation and regulation:A decision making perspective

This commentary considers the pros and cons of the empirical approach to legislation from the vantage point of empirical decision making research. It focuses on methodological aspects that are typically not considered by legal scholars. It points out weaknesses in the empirical approach that are undesirable from the legislator's perspective, and proposes potential remedies to these problems. It thereby aims to reduce the vagueness in the perceived problems on the side of the opponents, to reduce excessive enthusiasm on the side of the proponents, and to provide a road map to more robust empirical legislation

Risk taking under stress: The role(s) of self-selection:A comment on Buckert et al. (2014)

A commentary o